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Capsule

Ed Krisiunas

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What's new? What's hot? What's timely? If you don't have time to search the Internet for the latest developments that might impact your work environment, you just might find some of this information in the "Capsule" column. Please e-mail any comments or suggestions to ekrisiunas@aol.com or to Co-Editor Barbara Johnson at barbara_johnson@verizon.net or Co-Editor Karen B. Byers at karen_byers@dfci.harvard.edu.

Recommendations for the Selection and Use of Respirators and Protective Clothing for Protection Against Biological Agents

This document is based on current understandings of the potential agents and existing recommendations for biological aerosols and is oriented toward acts of terrorism. The recommendations provided here do not address, and are not applicable to, controlled use of biological agents in biosafety laboratories. Available at: www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2009-132/

Plan to Combat Extensively Drug-resistant Tuberculosis: Recommendations of the Federal Tuberculosis Task Force—*MMWR*, February 13, 2009/58(03):1-43

The recommendations provided in this report include specific actions and new activities that will require additional funding and a renewed commitment by government and non-government organizations involved in domestic and international TB control efforts to be implemented effectively. The Federal TB Task Force will coordinate the ac-

tivities of various federal agencies and partner with state and local health departments, nonprofit agencies, and TB advocacy organizations to implement this plan to control and prevent XDR TB in the United States and to contribute to global efforts in the fight against this emerging public health crisis. Available at: www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5803a1.htm

Hepatitis C Virus Transmission at an Outpatient Hemodialysis Unit—*MMWR*, March 6, 2009/56(08):189-194

In July 2008, the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) received reports of three hemodialysis patients seroconverting from anti-hepatitis C virus (HCV) negative to anti-HCV positive in a New York City hemodialysis unit during the preceding 6 months. This report summarizes the results of that investigation, which found that six additional patients had HCV seroconversion during 2001-2008 and that the hemodialysis unit had numerous deficiencies in infection control policies, procedures, and training. Available at: www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5808a2.htm

National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility—Update

The proposed National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) in Manhattan, Kansas, will research high-consequence biological threats involving zoonotic (i.e., transmitted from animals to humans) and foreign animal diseases. It will allow basic research; diagnostic development, testing, and validation; advanced countermea-

sure development; and training for high-consequence livestock diseases.

The NBAF will be designed to replace the current facilities at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) in New York, which is currently the only facility in the United States that studies the live virus that causes Foot-and-Mouth disease. There is currently no laboratory facility in the U.S. with capabilities for BSL-4 research on livestock. Available at: www.dhs.gov/xres/labs/editorial_0762.shtm

Chronic Wasting Disease Prions in Elk Antler Velvet

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a contagious, fatal prion disease of deer and elk that continues to emerge in new locations. To explore the

means by which prions are transmitted with high efficiency among cervids, we examined prion infectivity in the apical skin layer covering the growing antler (antler velvet) by using CWD-susceptible transgenic mice and protein misfolding cyclic amplification. Our finding of prions in the antler velvet of CWD-infected elk suggests that this tissue may play a role in disease transmission among cervids.

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